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AN INTERNATIONAL AND ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE OF HAMAS
AMY CHIANG*
God is its goal;
The Messenger is its Leader.
The Qur'an is its Constitution.
Jihad is its methodology, and
Death for the sake of God is its most coveted desire.
-Hamas 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent times, no group has sparked as much controversy as Hamas.
While it won democratic elections in January 2006, the United States, the
European Union, and Israel categorize Hamas as a terrorist organization. 2
How could a "terrorist organization" emerge as a political victor? To un-
derstand this group better it is important to evaluate it under international
humanitarian law and Islamic law.
Analyzing Hamas using only international law fails to take into ac-
count that Hamas is an organization that claims to derive its principles from
Islamic law. Hence, if Hamas can ever be persuaded to renounce violence,
it must be rooted in the laws and principles of Islam. As stated above, the
Qur'an is Hamas's Constitution, thus, according to Hamas, Islamic law
takes precedence over international law. While the global community can
use international law to condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization, this
does nothing to further the peace process. Islamic law must be used as an
instrument to bring Hamas to the negotiating table.
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008. I begin this work in the name of God.
Anything good in this note comes from God, and all defects in this work come from my own human
weakness. I would like to thank my family, especially my husband, Qasim Riaz, for all his patience and
support throughout law school. I would also like to thank Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. and Edward C.
Harris for their guidance and advice on this note. Finally, I would like to thank the Chicago-Kent
College of Law Library staff for always assisting me with my research questions.
1. Hamas Charter art. 8, reprinted in KHALED HROUB, HAMAS POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
PRACTICE app. at 272 (2000).
2. Who are Hamas?, BBC NEwS, Jan. 25, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/1654
510.stm.
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This note will discuss and explore relevant international law and apply
it to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Special attention is given to the recent
Hamas election victory. This note will also analyze how Hamas's military
tactics violate international law. Next, it will consider the general principles
of Islamic law, the Islamic law of war, and humanitarian principles during
times of war. Finally, an analysis of Islamic law is applied to Hamas's ac-
tions.
While it may be clear that Hamas violates international law, the an-
swer under Islamic law is not as clear. As with any religion, Islam is sub-
ject to a variety of interpretations. Moreover, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict
and its intricacies contribute to favorable Hamas rulings. However, Islam
can be used to convince Hamas to renounce violence and restart the peace
process.
I. HISTORY OF HAMAS
On December 14, 1987, a few days after the first intifada (Palestinian
uprising), Hamas released an official communiqu6 announcing its exis-
tence.3 Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Is-
lamic Resistance Movement), and an Arabic word that means zeal. 4 Hamas
describes itself as a Palestinian national liberation movement that struggles
to liberate the occupied territories and recognize the legitimate rights of the
Palestinians. 5 Hamas consists of three wings: social, political, and mili-
tary.6 Hamas is guided by the principles of Islam and Islam serves as its
frame of reference as seen by their key documents: a charter, political
memoranda, and communiquds. 7 While its early documents call for the
establishment of an Islamic state in all of Palestine, in the mid-1990s state-
ments from top Hamas officials call for Israel's withdrawal from lands
occupied in the 1967 war, the end of Israeli occupation, the formation of a
Palestinian state, and a solution to the refugee issue.
8
3. KHALED HROUB, HAMAS: A BEGINNER'S GUIDE 12 (2006).
4. MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM IN THE SERVICE OF JIHAD 8
(2006).
5. HROUB, supra note 3, at 17.
6. LEVITT, supra note 4, at 9.
7. See HROUB, supra note 1, at app. 263-312.
8. Sara Roy, Religious Nationalism and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Examining Hamas and
the Possibility of Reform, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 251, 253 (2004).
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II. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
The four Geneva Conventions comprise the bulk of what we call in-
ternational humanitarian law. The first three Conventions cover protection
of the wounded and sick, the shipwrecked, and prisoners of war.9 The
Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians from arbitrary treatment and
violence and it addresses occupied territories. 10 Additionally, two new draft
treaties were adopted in the 1970s.ll Protocol I laid out new rules on inter-
national armed conflict, while Protocol II established rules for non-
international armed conflicts. 12
The Geneva Conventions are binding on 175 States, and every one of
the 191 members of the United Nations has ratified them.13 Protocols I and
II are ratified by 163 States, including four out of fivel 4 permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council. 15 Additionally, governments, the United Na-
tions, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) invoke
both Protocols during times of armed conflict. 16 Thus, a strong argument
can be made that all four Conventions and Protocols I and II are customary
international law.
III. DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLY TO THE PALESTINIAN CONFLICT?
The 1907 Hague Regulations address the concept of belligerent occu-
pation. "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under
the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the terri-
tory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.' 17
The Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocols I and II were adopted to
supplement the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land ("1907 Hague Convention"), along with its annexed
9. Hans-Peter Gasser, International Humanitarian Law, in A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAWS 204, 214 (Naorem Sanajaoba ed., 2004).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 215.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 214; Demian Casey, Note, Breaking the Chain of Violence in Israel and Palestine:
Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings Under International Humanitarian Law, 32 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 311,319 (2005).
14. The United States is the only permanent member who has not ratified the Protocols, although
it is a signatory.
15. Casey, supra note 13, at 319.
16. Id.
17. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex art. 42, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
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Regulations ("1907 Hague Regulations"). 18 The Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion is devoted to protecting civilian rights during times of war. The inhabi-
tants of occupied territories are protected by all the provisions in the Fourth
Convention that relate to civilian populations as a whole, by the Hague
Regulations, and by the thirty-two articles of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion that are devoted to occupied territories. 19 Since Israel occupies Pales-
tinian territory, the Palestinian people should be afforded all the rights and
protections given to them under international law.
Israel, however, denies that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to
its occupation of the Palestinian territories. 20 The Israeli government claims
it voluntarily applies international humanitarian law. 21 The Israeli govern-
ment adopted the "missing reversioner" theory, where it argues that the
Fourth Geneva Convention only applies when a legitimate sovereign has
been displaced. 22 Israel argues that since neither Jordan in the West Bank
nor Egypt in Gaza were legitimate sovereigns in 1967 (because they gained
the territory in their fight against Israel during the war in 1948), Israel's
presence in the West Bank and Gaza did not displace a sovereign. 23 There-
fore, their presence cannot be an occupation; rather, it is an "administra-
tion" in the absence of a legitimate sovereign, a situation that the Fourth
Geneva Convention does not cover. 24 The Israeli government also argues
that Israel gained the West Bank and Gaza as part of a defensive conquest,
and since there was no prior sovereign, legal title is conferred on Israel. 25
These arguments have received little respect or endorsement from the in-
ternational community, and most of the world community adopts the view
that Israel's maximum legal claim to Palestinian territories is based on its
control pursuant to the law of belligerent occupation, which imposes duties
under the Hague and Fourth Geneva Conventions.26
18. Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44
HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 89 (2003).
19. Gasser, supra note 9, at 248.
20. Imseis, supra note 18, at 93.
21. Casey, supra note 13, at 320.
22. Richard A. Falk & Bums H. Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Israeli and
Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF




26. Id. at 132, 134.
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IV. RECENT PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS-JANUARY 2006
In January of 2006 Hamas shocked the world when it gained seventy-
four of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Parliament. 27 To understand the
implications of the election, it is necessary to explore the various Palestin-
ian groups, including the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the
Palestinian Authority (PA), and Hamas.
A. Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
On June 1, 1964, the PLO was founded, and in 1968 it adopted the
Palestinian National Charter.28 The charter states that the Palestinian peo-
ple have a legal right to establish a state, it defines the Palestinian people
and their objectives, and it provides that the PLO will act as an interna-
tional representative on behalf of all Palestinians. 29 Accordingly, the PLO
is responsible for the activities of the Palestinian people while they struggle
to liberate their land and practice their right of self-determination. 30 The
charter defines the Palestinian people as "those Arab nationals who, until
1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted
from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian
father-whether inside Palestine or outside it-is also a Palestinian.
'31
Thus, the PLO represents Palestinians who live outside the West Bank and
Gaza. The PLO's goal is to give the Palestinians an opportunity to return to
their homeland to exercise their right of self-determination.
32
In 1969, the General Assembly passed resolutions that recognized the
Palestinians' status as a people, the importance of their participation in
resolving the Palestine question, and their right to self-determination. 33 In
1974, the General Assembly invited the PLO to participate in plenary meet-
ings of the General Assembly concerning Palestine, and in a later resolu-
tion the Assembly requested the Secretary General to establish contact with
the PLO on all matters concerning the questions of Palestine. 34 In the same
session, the General Assembly granted the PLO observer status, inviting it
27. Joel Greenberg, Hamas Asserting its Authority: Lawmakers Rescind New Abbas Powers, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 7, 2006, at 1.
28. Omar M. Dajani, Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal Status of Palestine During
the Interim Period, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 49 (1997).
29. See Palestine National Charter, available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22573.htm.
30. Id. art. 26.
31. Id. art. 5.
32. Dajani, supra note 28, at 50.
33. Id. at41.
34. G.A. Res. 3236 (XXIX), 7, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Nov. 22, 1974).
20081
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to participate in the work of the General Assembly and of all international
conferences convened by the General Assembly or other United Nations
organs. 35 Further, the PLO is recognized by over 100 states, of which sixty
accord the PLO full diplomatic status. 36
The PLO has a legislative branch (the Palestine National Council, or
PNC), and an Executive Committee. 37 In 1988, in response to the first Pal-
estinian uprising (intifada), the PNC voted to adopt the Palestinian Declara-
tion of Independence, which proclaimed the establishment of a Palestinian
state with Jerusalem as its capital. 38 Israel regarded the PLO as a terrorist
organization and refused to recognize the declaration, but by 1989, 114
nations extended some form of recognition to the Palestinian state. How-
ever, most of these countries recognized the state as a legal aspiration
rather than an existing reality.39 The declaration did little to alter the status
of Palestine as a state, but it attempted to affirm the international legitimacy
of the Palestinian cause.
Israel and the United States did not recognize the PLO until 1993.40 In
Oslo, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, but only
after PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat sent a letter to Israeli Prime Minister
Itzhak Rabin stating that Israel had the right to exist in peace and security,
that the PLO renounced the use of force against Israel, and that the articles
in the Palestinian National Charter that opposed Israel's right to exist were
inoperative and invalid.41
While the PLO is made up of many political parties, the Fatah group
has always dominated and controlled the PLO. 42 Yasser Arafat was the
Committee Chairman from February 1969 until his death in November of
2004.43 The current Chairman of the PLO is Mahmoud Abbas.
44
35. G.A. Res. 3237 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Nov. 22, 1974).
36. Math Noortmann, Non-State Actors in International Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 59,68 (Bas Arts et al. eds., 2001).
37. Dajani, supra note 28, at 51.
38. Palestine Declaration of Independence, G.A. Res. 43/827, Annex 1II, U.N. Doc. A/43/827
(Nov. 18, 1988).
39. Dajani, supra note 28, at 59-60.
40. Id. at 53.
41. John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties? 30 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 717, 720 (1997).
42. Robert H. Mnookin, Ehud Eiran & Sreemati Mitter, Barriers to Progress at the Negotiation
Table: Internal Conflicts Among Israelis and Among Palestinians, 6 NEv. L.J. 299, 333 (Winter
2005/2006).
43. Samah Jabr, New Hamas Government Trumps Old PLO, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE EAST
AFFAIRS, May-June 2006, at 13, 45.
44. Id.
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B. Palestinian Authority (PA)
Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles in 1993.
4 5
This document established a framework for further negotiations regarding
the status of the Occupied Territories; in the interim, it established a Pales-
tinian self-governing authority called the Palestinian Authority (PA).4 6 The
PA's power and structure are enumerated by the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (IA). 4 7 The Palestinians
are given a larger role in the territories' administration even though they
are still under Israeli occupation. 48 Further, the agreement clearly indicates
that the PA is separate from the PLO.4 9 Moreover, the Interim Agreement
specifically prohibits the PA from participating in international negotia-
tions that could influence its international status.50 Thus, the PA has a lim-
ited role in local governance within the occupied territories.
Originally, the PA consisted of a Palestinian Legislative Council
(PLC, or the PA's Parliament) with limited legislative authority, and a
President with executive authority. 5 1 The members of the Council and the
President are both democratically elected. 52 Yasser Arafat once served as
the President of the PA,53 but a prime minister position was created in 2003
to devolve power away from Yasser Arafat's powerful but dysfunctional
presidency.54 It is the president's job to pick the prime minister, in coopera-
tion with the largest party in Parliament, which is now Hamas.
55
C. PLO v. PA
The PLO and PA are functionally and legally divided groups. As
noted above, the PLO is the independent and international voice of the
Palestinian people (not just the Palestinians living in the West Bank and
Gaza). However, the PLO lacks direct authority over the Palestinians living
45. Dajani, supra note 28, at 60.
46. Id. at 61.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Sanford R. Silverberg, Diplomatic Recognition of States in Statu Nascendi: The Case of
Palestine, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 21,39 (1998).
50. Dajani, supra note 28, at 68.
51. Id. at 61.
52. Id.
53. Obituary: Yasser Arafat, BBC NEWS, Nov. 11, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/890161 .stm.
54. UK Welcomes Mid-East 'Road Map', BBC NEWS, Apr. 30, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uknews/politics/2989689.stm.
55. Q&A: Hamas Election Victory, BBC NEWS, Jan. 26, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/4650300.stm.
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in the West Bank and Gaza because the PA directly governs these areas.
While the PLO can act on behalf of the Palestinian people on an interna-
tional level, the PA serves the interest of the Palestinian population within
the occupied territories. In short, the PLO exists to secure the Palestinians a
right to govern themselves, and the PA was established as a government
with limited authority to serve the local needs of the Palestinians living in
the occupied territories. 56
It is worth noting that until recently, the PLO and PA were fundamen-
tally intertwined. The PLO negotiated the creation of the PA, the two or-
ganizations shared a leader in Yasser Arafat, and both were run by the
Fatah political party.57 Further, members of the PA Parliament, by virtue of
their office, hold seats in the PLO National Council.
58
Recently, the distinctive functions of the PLO and PA have blurred.
While the Interim Agreement prohibits the PA from engaging in any exter-
nal relations, the PA has negotiated with international players in recent
years. The Quartet (the United States, Russia, European Union, and the
United Nations) drafted the "road map" for peace that would eventually
lead to a permanent Palestinian state. 59 The draft never mentions the PLO,
but the PA's government and security roles are highlighted throughout. 60
Further, all the negotiations regarding the "road map" have taken place
between the Quartet and Mahmoud Abbas in his role as the PA's Presi-
dent.61 In his own words, Abbas stated that "[t]he political objective of the
Palestinian Authority is to end the occupation that started in 1967, establish
an independent Palestinian state, and find a just and agreed upon solution to
the issue of the refugees under Resolution No. 194."62 His statement further
signifies that the PA's role is not limited to local Palestinian affairs. The
PA seems to be gaining wider legitimacy among the international commu-
nity, and while it is technically the PLO who represents the Palestinian
people on an international level, it is the PA who has been on the forefront
of the "road map" negotiations. If the peace process is revived, it is likely
56. Dajani, supra note 28, at 74.
57. Id. at 72.
58. Khalil Shikaki, The Palestinian Elections: Sweeping Victory, Uncertain Mandate, J.
DEMOCRACY, July 2006, at 116, 124.
59. Michael Emerson & Nathalie Tocci, Road Maps and Final Destinations for Israel and Pales-
tine 1 (Ctr. for Eur. Pol'y Stud. Middle East and Euro-Med Project, Working Paper No. 12, 2003).
60. Id. at 17-20.
61. See, e.g., Yossi Beilin, Op-Ed., Road Maps and Dead Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at
A27.
62. Kenneth Stein, In Mahmoud Abbas's Own Words, POLICY BRIEFS (Wash. Inst. for Near East
Policy, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 7, 2005, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf.php?template=C05&
CID=2225.
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that the PA will continue to negotiate with the international community on
behalf of the Palestinian people.
D. Hamas as a National Liberation Movement
Until the recent elections, Hamas refused to participate in any national
elections because the PA grew out of the Oslo Accords, which Hamas con-
sidered illegitimate. 63 Since Hamas is now a part of the PA, members of the
Quartet are demanding that Hamas meet the peace-related obligations that
the PLO and PA agreed to after the Oslo Accords, including recognizing
Israel and renouncing violence. 64 Since Hamas has refused these demands,
the United States and European Union halted all aid to the PA, compromis-
ing the survival of the Hamas-led government.
65
The First Geneva Protocol of 1977 classifies armed conflict as interna-
tional where people are "fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-
determination. ' 66 National liberation movements were prevalent after
World War 11.67 While there are no objective criteria to determine the exis-
tence of national liberation movements, the movements have some general
characteristics. 68 The essential characteristic of national liberation move-
ments is their "international legitimation based on the principle of self-
determination. ' '69 Their international status is based on their political goals,
namely, their struggle to free themselves from colonial rule, racist regimes,
or alien occupation. 70 While nothing in Protocol I requires a movement to
control territory, some scholars argue the movement is given international
status because it acquires territory, or at least strives to.7 1 Other scholars
argue that a movement must be recognized by the regional organization in
63. Khaled Hroub, A "New Hamas" Through Its New Documents, J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer
2003, at 6.
64. Shikaki, supra note 58, at 116.
65. Hamas Faces European Aid Threat, BBC NEWS, Jan. 29, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle east/4660648.stm.
66. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16
I.L.M. 1390 [hereinafter Protocol I].
67. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 140 (2d ed. 2005).
68. HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 138 (1988).
69. CASSESE, supra note 67, at 140.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 141. Cassese argues that the movement must strive to acquire effective control over a




the area to qualify as a national liberation movement. 72 For instance, the
League of Arab States is the regional organization that recognizes the PLO
as a national liberation movement. 73 Additionally, a debate also exists as to
whether a movement's international status turns on international recogni-
tion of the organization's political goals.74 Further, to gain rights and be
subject to obligations, the organization must have an organization that can
represent the movement and negotiate with other states or international
organizations. 75
The rights and duties of these movements include: the right to self-
determination, the obligation to follow the rules of war, the rights and obli-
gations of treaty making, and the right to claim respect and protection for
people represented by their organization. 76
In Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh's cabinet platform, he stated that the
goals of his government were, in part, to resist the occupation, to provide
security in Palestinian areas, and to develop relations at the regional and
international levels to serve the interests of the Palestinian people. 77 These
are the basic characteristics and goals of a national liberation movement.
According to the Hamas Charter, Hamas's goal is to liberate Palestine
and return it to its rightful place. 78 Hamas strives to liberate Palestine by
resisting the Israeli occupation, and seeks to serve and spread Islam. 79
Hamas sought to acquire territory to fulfill this goal.80 Although the League
of Arab States has only recognized the PLO as a national liberation move-
ment, this factor on its own does not defeat the argument that Hamas is
likewise a national liberation movement. While the international commu-
nity has recognized the Palestinian right to self-determination and endorsed
the idea of a Palestinian state, Hamas has not gained international recogni-
tion because of its militant tactics. While Hamas is a representative organi-
zation capable of negotiating with the international community, the
international community will not negotiate with a Hamas-led government.
The question is whether the international community may refuse to
deal with a Hamas-led PA where it previously recognized the PA. There
72. See Leslie C. Green, Low-Intensity Conflict and the Law, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 503
(1997).
73. WILSON, supra note 68, at 145.
74. Noortmann, supra note 36, at 67-68.
75. Id.
76. CASSESE, supra note 67, at 141-42.
77. Hroub, supra note 63.
78. The Hamas Charter, supra note 1, at art. 9.
79. HROUB, supra note 3, at 26.
80. Id. at 19.
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are no objective criteria to determine a government's legitimacy, thus, each
state evaluates a foreign government's legitimacy through its own crite-
ria.81 Since recognition is at the discretion of each sovereign, there is a
debate over whether governmental recognition is a legal question, or a
purely political question. 82 The prevailing view is that recognition is an
optional and political act. 83 In Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, the
Supreme Court accepted this view when it stated "[w]hat government is to
be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political
rather than a judicial question, and is to be determined by the political de-
partment of the government." 84
Since the Cold War, the legitimacy of a government has been heavily
dependent on the government's democratic character. 85 However, a democ-
ratically-elected government, like Hamas, can loose its legitimacy because
its exercise of power conflicts with substantive elements of democracy. 86
For example, the U.N. General Assembly disqualified South Africa's gov-
ernment for using its power to implement a racist apartheid regime. 87 Thus,
while Hamas was democratically elected and announced it plans to form a
unity government with Fatah, the Quartet refuses to recognize a Hamas-led
government unless it renounces violence, recognizes Israel, and meets the
obligations of previous agreements between the Israelis and the Palestini-
ans.88 This is parallel to the PLO's situation. Even though the U.N. and
other governments recognized the PLO as the legitimate international rep-
resentative of the Palestinian people, it was not until the PLO recognized
Israel and renounced violence that Israel and the United States recognized
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. 89 Thus, there is no
legal obligation for any state to recognize a Hamas-led government.
While Hamas lacks international recognition of its political goals, it
nevertheless maintains the essential characteristic of a national liberation
movement, which is to free Palestine from occupation. Thus, it can qualify
81. Jean d'Aspremont, Note, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 877, 879 (2006).
82. Robert D. Sloane, The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of
Tibet, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 107, 120 (2002).
83. Id.
84. 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938).
85. d'Aspremont, supra note 81, at 887.
86. Id. at 910.
87. Id. at 911.
88. Richard Galpin, Hamas Chief Set for Moscow Talks, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2007, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6395737.stm.
89. Imseis, supra note 18, at 84.
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as a national liberation movement that has the right to a limited interna-
tional legal personality.
V. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLIED TO HAMAS
International humanitarian law recognizes international conflicts and
non-international conflicts. 90 Wars between two or more states are interna-
tional conflicts, while fighting that occurs within one state are non-
international (or internal) conflicts.9 1 However, under Article 1(4) of Proto-
col I, wars of national liberation are considered international armed con-
flicts. 92 Israel and the United States are not a party to this treaty. 93
However, no state fighting against a national liberation movement has ever
acknowledged it was fighting an international conflict, and since World
War II no state has accepted that a national liberation movement had the
right to use force against it.94 This, however, does not mean that interna-
tional law does not apply to the conflict. It is significant that many states
ratified Protocol I with Article 1(4) because it illustrates that many states
consider the movements legitimate under international law. 95 If states did
not believe in their legitimacy they could have continued to treat national
liberation movements as subjects to domestic law. 96 Hence, the Palestinian
struggle for self-determination is an international conflict.
Combatants are members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict.
97
Only a combatant is entitled to fight and eligible to be killed, but the com-
batant must stay within the limits of international law. 98 Article I of the
1907 Hague Convention lists the requirements of a lawful combatant.
Regular armies, militias, and volunteer corps must satisfy four conditions:
(1) they must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(2) they must have a fixed, distinctive emblem that is recognizable from a
distance; (3) they must carry arms openly; and (4) they must conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.99
90. Gasser, supra note 9, at 223.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 224.
93. Oma Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law' A Legal
Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233, 256 (2003).
94. WILSON, supra note 68, at 124.
95. Id. at 129.
96. Id.
97. Protocol 1, supra note 66, art. 43(2).
98. Gasser, supra note 9, at 227.
99. Hague Convention IV, supra note 17, art. 1.
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The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third
Geneva Convention) lists the criteria for a combatant to qualify as a
POW. 100 Generally, members of regular armed forces are entitled to POW
protection as long as they are captured while in uniform.101 However,
members of militias or volunteer corps, including organized resistance
movements, had to fulfill several conditions to receive POW status. Article
4A(2) provides that:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, includ-
ing those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the
conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this terri-
tory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including
such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subor-
dinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
The goal of Protocols I and II was to create new rules for irregular
forces and to relax the Hague and Geneva Convention standards. 102 Article
43 of Protocol I provides a new definition of armed forces.103 It states that:
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that
Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented
by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party.
Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system
which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict. 104
Paragraph (2) of the same article states that members of the armed
forces, other than medical personnel and chaplains, are combatants and
have the right to directly participate in hostilities. 105 Next, Article 44 pro-
vides that "[a]ny combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the
100. Geneva Convention (Third) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
101. ROBERT K. GOLDMAN & BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, UNPRIVILEGED
COMBATANTS AND THE HOSTILITIES IN AFGHANISTAN: THEIR STATUS AND RIGHTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2002), http://www.asil.org/taskforce/gold
man.pdf.
102. Brett Shumate, New Rules for a New War: The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to Al-
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees Captured in Afghanistan, 18 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 23, (2005).
103. Id. at 24.
104. Protocol I, supra note 66, art. 43(1).
105. Id. art. 43(2).
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power of an adverse Party, shall be a prisoner of war." 106 Thus, Article 43
eliminates the distinction between regular armed forces and irregular vol-
untary corps, militias, and other organized resistance movements.107 Proto-
col I places all of a party's armed forces on equal legal ground and requires
that all combatants, not just irregulars, be under a responsible command.10
8
Protocol I also contains a more expansive rule of distinction that
makes is more difficult for combatants to loose their POW status. 109 Para-
graph (3) of Article 44 states that "[i]n order to promote the protection of
the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are
obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they
are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an at-
tack."1 10 Thus, having a fixed emblem is not an essential requirement for
members of the armed forces to receive POW status.11 If a combatant fails
to distinguish himself, he may be liable for breaching the laws of war, but
he does not loose his status as a combatant or POW.112
A combatant will loose his POW status if he does not comply with the
additional requirements in Article 44(3). This Article states that:
There are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall re-
tain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries
his arms openly: (a) During each military engagement, and (b) During
such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a mili-
tary deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to
participate.
Section (b) has been interpreted to mean that a combatant is required
to carry arms openly from the moment he is visible while going to the place
where the attack will start.113 If a combatant is caught while not fulfilling
section (b) he forfeits his status as a lawful combatant and cannot enjoy the
protections given to prisoners of war.'1 4 However, the combatant is still
entitled to humane treatment and a regularly conducted trial as prescribed
by the Geneva Conventions. 115
106. Id. art. 44(1).
107. Shumate, supra note 102, at 24.
108. GOLDMAN & TITrEMORE, supra note 101, at 17.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Protocol I, supra note 66, art. 44(3).
111. CASSESE, supra note 67, at 406 (citation omitted).
112. GOLDMAN & TITrEMORE, supra note 101, at 20.
113. CASSESE, supra note 67, at 407.
114. Protocol I, supra note 66, art. 44(4).
115. Gasser, supra note 9, at 263.
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Further, Article 45(1) presumes that a person who takes part in the
hostilities is a POW if he claims that status, if he appears to be entitled to
the status, or if his Party claims it for him.'1 6 If it is unclear whether com-
batants belong to one of the legitimate belligerent categories, they enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time that their status can be
determined by a competent tribunal. 117
As a national liberation movement, Hamas should be entitled to apply
Protocol I's relaxed standards to its members, but it currently does not en-
joy these standards. Under Article 96(3), armed forces of national libera-
tion movements do not receive all the protections of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I unless the movement formally accepts all the
attendant obligations. 1 8 They accept these obligations when they make a
unilateral declaration of adhesion and compliance and send it the Swiss
government as depository. 19 To date, Hamas has made no such declara-
tion, and in the past it has stated that it will only be bound by Islamic
Law. 120 Therefore, the relaxed combatant and POW standards in Protocol I
do not apply to Hamas. According to the Third Geneva Convention, in
order for Hamas members to enjoy prisoner of war status they must comply
with the four original requirements stated in the Hague Convention. 121
Hamas does not comply with these requirements because its members have
no fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, and they do not carry
arms openly.
Moreover, Israeli courts reject the argument that Hamas members are
freedom fighters. 122 Israel considers Hamas a terrorist organization and its
members terrorists. 123 Israeli courts typically charge members with crimes
relating to terrorist activities and try them under Israeli domestic law, thus,
Israel does not consider Hamas members to be POWs.124
116. Protocol I, supra note 66, art. 45(1).
117. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 100, art. 5.
118. George H. Aldrich, Why the United States Should Ratify Additional Protocol I, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 127, 135 (Astrid J.M. Delissen &
Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
119. Protocol 1, supra note 66, art. 96(3); Green, supra note 72, at 504.
120. Gabriel Swiney, Saving Lives: The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modern War,
39 INT'L LAW. 733, 747 (2005).
121. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 100, art. 4(A)(2).
122. Emanuel Gross, Democracy in the War Against Terrorism-The Israeli Experience, 35 LOY.
L.A.L. REv. 1161, 1189 (2002).
123. Id.
124. See Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem ofAdministrative Detention in
Israel: Does a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 721, 724 (2001).
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VI. HAS HAMAS VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW?
A. War Crimes
Broadly defined, war crimes are violations of the law of war; however,
in Prosecutor v. Tadi6, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) set out a more precise definition. 125 War crimes consist
of: (1) an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law; (2) the
rule must be customary in nature or be a part of an applicable treaty; (3) the
violation must be serious, which means the broken rule must protect impor-
tant human values and must involve grave consequences for the victim; and
(4) the violation of the rule under customary or conventional law must en-
tail individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule. 126
There is no list of war crimes under customary law, but the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court lists violations of international
humanitarian law that qualify as war crimes.12 7 The Rome Statute is not
customary law, but the elements of the crimes are taken from customary
law such as the Geneva Conventions and Protocols I and 11.128 The Rome
Statute's definitions are supplemented by a text that lays out the elements
of each crime. 129 Together, these documents provide clear definitions of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 130
The possible war crimes that are applicable to Hamas under Article 8
of the Rome Statute are: willful killing, intentionally attacking the civilian
population, and intentionally launching attacks that cause excessive inci-
dental death, injury, or damage. 131 The Elements of Crime text details the
elements of each of these crimes. The last two elements of each crime are
the same: "[t]he conduct took place in the context of and was associated
with an international armed conflict" and "[t]he perpetrator was aware of
factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed con-
flict.1'32
125. CASSESE, supra note 67, at 437.
126. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 94 (ICTY Ap. Ch. Oct. 2, 1995).
127. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinaf-
ter Rome Statute].
128. Casey, supra note 13, at 322.
129. Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, New
York, U.S., Sept. 3-10, 2002, Official Records, pt. II(B), U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/I/3 [hereinafter Assem-
bly on States Parties].
130. Rome Statute, supra note 127, art. 8.
131. Id. arts. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(b)(iv).
132. Assembly of States Parties, supra note 129, art. 8(2)(a)(i)
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These two elements are fulfilled. As explained above, the current con-
flict is international, and Hamas is aware that an armed conflict exists. Af-
ter Hamas's election victory in January 2006, Hamas leader Mahmoud
Zahar declared, "We do not recognize the Israeli enemy, nor his right to be
our neighbor, nor to stay (on the land), nor his ownership of any inch of
land.... We are interested in restoring our full rights to return all the peo-
ple of Palestine to the land of Palestine."
133
B. Willful Killing
The term willful killing comes from Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. 134 Killing a protected person is a "grave breach" of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. 135 Protected persons are "those who, at a given mo-
ment in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of
which they are not nationals."'136 Further, murders of all kinds are prohib-
ited against those not taking an active part in the hostilities. 1
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The Elements of Crime text lists the elements for willful killing: (1)
the perpetrator killed one or more persons; (2) such person or persons were
protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; and (3)
the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that
protected status. 138
When Hamas targets public establishments such as restaurants and
buses, its members may be liable for willful killing because they kill one or
more persons, the persons killed are protected persons under the Geneva
Conventions, and Hamas is aware of their protected status. Israeli civilians
are considered protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. A civilian
is someone who is not a member of an organized armed force or a party to
a conflict. 139 Civilians are protected until they take direct part in hostili-
ties. 140 However, participation in hostilities only causes a loss of protection
while the civilians participate in hostilities. 141 Thus, even though military
133. Anti-Defamation League, Hamas Fact Sheet, http://www.adl.org/main-israel/hamasfacts.htm
(last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
134. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
135. Id. art. 147.
136. Id. art. 4.
137. Id. art. 3.
138. Assembly of States Parties, supra note 129, art. 8(2)(a)(i).
139. Protocol 1, supra note 66, art. 50.
140. Id. art. 51(3).
141. Id.
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service is mandatory for all males and females in Israel, 142 while they are
off-duty they are considered civilians, and are a protected class. Further, if
there is any doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be con-
sidered a civilian. 143 Hamas is aware of this status even if it does not agree
with it. After an attack on a restaurant in 2001, Hamas leader Sheikh
Ahmad Yassin said, "The Geneva Convention protects civilians in occu-
pied territories, not civilians who are in fact occupiers. All of Israel, Tel
Aviv included, is occupied Palestine. So we're not actually targeting civil-
ians-that would go against Islam."' 144
Thus, all the elements of willful killing are fulfilled, and Hamas perpe-
trators may be held liable for this specific war crime.
C. Intentionally Attacking the Civilian Population
Article 51 of Protocol I protects the civilian population from attack. It
outlaws targeting the civilian population or individual civilians, and it pro-
hibits attacks or threats that spread terror among the civilian population. 145
As stated earlier, civilians enjoy this protection as long as they do not di-
rectly participate in the hostilities. 146 Civilians will lose their protected
status while they participate in hostilities, but they cannot be killed at other
times when they do not pose a threat to others' lives. 147
The Elements of Crime text lists the elements for intentionally attack-
ing the civilian population: (1) the perpetrator directed an attack; (2) the
object of the attack was civilian objects, not military objectives; and (3) the
perpetrator intended such civilian objects to be the target of the attack. 148
When Hamas targets public establishments its members may be liable
for intentionally attacking the civilian population. Intent is illustrated by the
choice of target, and the claims of responsibility. One senior Hamas leader
noted that "the main thing is to guarantee a large number of enemy will be
affected." 149 Further, Hamas claims responsibility for its attacks.1 50
142. See Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic? Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity, 13
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 259 (1999).
143. Protocol I, supra note 66, art. 50(1).
144. HuM. RTS. WATCH, ERASED IN A MOMENT: SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI
CIVILIANS 54-55 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.orglreports/2002/isr-pa/ [hereinafter ERASED IN
A MOMENT].
145. Protocol 1, supra note 66, art. 51(2).
146. Id. art. 51(3).
147. AMNESTY INT'L, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: ISRAEL MUST END ITS POLICY OF
ASSASSINATIONS (2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/056/2003/en/
dom-MDE 150562003en.pdf.
148. Assembly of States Parties, supra note 129, art. 8(2)(b)(ii).
149. ERASED IN A MOMENT, supra note 144.
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Hamas argues that since Israel requires mandatory military service and
requires reserve duty up until a certain age, Israeli citizens are legitimate
targets of attack. Sheikh Yassin stated:
They are all in the military, men and women.... They wear civilian
clothes inside Israel, and military clothes when they are with us .... The
20,000 or 30,000 reserve soldiers, where did they come from? Are they
not part of the Israeli people? Were they not civilians?
15 1
However, Protocol I clearly states that civilians are protected as long
as they do not take part in hostilities. 152 Even if every person on a targeted
bus was subject to reserve duty, they are still protected citizens. Thus,
Hamas members may be liable for the war crime of intentionally attacking
the civilian population.
D. Excessive Incidental Death, Injury, or Damage
Article 51 of Protocol I protects citizens from indiscriminate attacks,
which include: (1) attacks not directed at a specific military objective; (2)
attacks that use a method or means that cannot be directed at a specific
military objective; or (3) attacks that use a method or means that cannot be
limited, and thus strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction. 153 This Article is part of customary international
law. 154
The Elements of Crime text lists the elements for excessive incidental
death, injury, or damage: (1) the perpetrator launched an attack; (2) the
attack caused incidental death or injury to a civilian, damage to civilian
objects, or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment,
and the death, injury, or damage was of such an extent that it was clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated; and (3) the perpetrator knew that the attack would have such an
effect. 155
When Hamas targets public establishments, its members may be liable
for excessive incidental death, injury, or damage because they target civil-
ians with knowledge that incidental civilian deaths will occur. Their objec-
tive is to force the withdrawal of Israelis from their land, but this does not
mean that they can target civilians. Further, Hamas knows that its attacks
150. See Anti-Defamation League, Major Terrorist Attacks in Israel, http://www.adl.org/IsraeU
israel attacks.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2006).
151. ERASED IN A MOMENT, supra note 144.
152. Protocol I, supra note 66, art. 51(3).
153. Id. art. 5 1(4).
154. CASSESE, supra note 67, at 416.
155. Assembly of States Parties, supra note 129, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
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will cause incidental death or injury, and it picks targets to fulfill this ob-
jective. As mentioned above, a Hamas leader stated that "the main thing is
to guarantee a large number of enemy will be affected."'] 56 The enemies are
Israelis, and while Hamas does not consider them civilians, under interna-
tional humanitarian law, they are civilians and should be protected from
indiscriminate attacks. Thus, Hamas members may be liable for the war
crime of excessive incidental death, injury, or damage.
While the international world condemns Hamas as a terrorist organiza-
tion, some may wonder how Hamas won its election victory when it seems
clear that it violates international law. The fact is that Hamas's political
victories correspond heavily with the political environment at the time of
the elections. 157 Hamas's popularity drops when Palestinians are hopeful
that peace can be made with Israel. 158 However, when there is a high level
of frustration with the peace process, Hamas's popularity increases. 159 An-
other reason for Hamas's popularity among Palestinians is its social
work. 160 Hamas provides structured education, health, and welfare services
to the poor.161 It was well known that Hamas would even give monthly
help to employees of the Fatah-led PA when their income was considered
to be below the poverty level. 162 Hamas's recent 2006 election victory can
be attributed to the increase in Israeli military aggression, its social ser-
vices, and the failure of the corrupt Fatah-led PA to broker peace. 163 Thus,
Hamas's victory is not necessarily an endorsement of its military tactics by
the Palestinian population.
VII. UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW
While it is useful to analyze Hamas under international law, it is also
necessary to explore Islamic law because Hamas derives its principles from
Islam. 164 Islamic international law is called as-siyar. 165 However, interna-
tional Islamic law is not separate from domestic Islamic law-it is merely
an extension of Islamic law that governs relations of Muslims with non-
156. ERASED IN A MOMENT, supra note 144.
157. HROUB, supra note 3, at 79.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 70.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 71.
163. Id. at 80.
164. Id. at 18.
165. Literally the term means motion, but Islamic jurists use it when referring to the conduct of the
state in its relationships with others.
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Muslims. 166 The siyar is a self-imposed system of law and it is binding on
those who profess Islam as their faith. 167
There are four main sources that make up Islamic law: the Qur'an, the
sunnah, ijma', and qiy'as. 168 The Qur'an is the word of God as revealed to
Prophet Muhammad.169 The sunnah are the traditions of the Prophet Mu-
hammad and are made up of his actions and sayings. The sunnah helps
interpret the Qur'an. Many scholars preserved these actions and sayings in
written form, which are called hadith. Ijma' is a consensus among Islamic
jurists. 170 When consensus is reached among Islamic jurists, ijma' occurs,
and the rule or opinion is considered law. 171 Qiy'as means analogical de-
duction and it can only be used if there is no guidance from the Qur'an,
sunnah, or ijma'. 172 Shari'at law is the interpretation of all these principle
sources, and it is an all-embracing code of life for Muslims.' 73
In addition to the principle sources, Islamic international law is also
comprised of treaties and peace agreements with non-Muslims, official
statements and instructions of the Caliphs 174 to their commanders, and the
writings of eminent Muslim jurists. 175 When the International Court of
Justice decides disputes, it applies international conventions, international
custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and judi-
cial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.' 76 The
sources of Islamic international law fit into these categories. The Qur'an
and hadith are general principles of law, the sunnah and local practices are
custom, treaties with non-Muslims are conventions, and ijma' and qiy'as
are teachings. ' 77
166. MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANT'S SIYAR 6 (1966).
167. Id.
168. See Farooq A. Hassan, The Sources of Islamic Law, 76 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 65, 65-67
(1982).
169. Id. at 66.
170. Id at 67.
171. Id.
172. Shaheen Sardar Ali & Javaid Rehman, The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law, 10
J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 321, 325 (2005).
173. Nayer Honarvar, Beyond the Veil: Women's Rights in Islamic Societies, 6 J.L. & RELIGION
355, 362 (1988).
174. The Caliphs were Prophet Muhammad's successors.
175. KHADDURI, supra note 166, at 8-9.
176. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.
177. KHADDURI, supra note 166, at 9.
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VIII.WAR IN ISLAM
While this note has focused onjus in bello (law in war), it is necessary
to give a brief overview ofjus ad bellum (law of war) in Islam because it is
a topic that is greatly misunderstood. It automatically colors the perception
of Islam and organizations that claim to adhere to its principles, like
Hamas. Thus, a general overview of war in Islam follows.
Today one of the few Arabic words people think they understand isji-
had. The term is often incorrectly translated as "holy war."' 178 The word
comes from the rootjahd, which means effort or struggle.1
79 Most Muslims
believe that jihad is an inner struggle against the nafs.180 In a hadith,
Prophet Muhammad told his companions after returning from battle that
they had returned from the minor jihad to the major one. They asked what
the major jihad was, and he replied, "it is jihad against the nafs."'181 In an-
other hadith, Prophet Muhammad also stated that "it is the greatest jihad to
speak words of justice and truth to an oppressive ruler."' 182 Generally, jihad
is the struggle against or resistance to something for the sake of a goal.
Thus, it can mean peaceful actions, as well as actions relating to war.
There is a debate among Islamic legal scholars about when the use of
force is authorized. Generally, scholars can be categorized as classic or
modernist. Most classic scholars wrote during a time when the Islamic
empire was expanding, so much of their writing revolves around offensive
wars rather than defensive wars. 183 Defensive wars were fought to save
Muslim lives and property from aggression, and this is sanctified in the
Qur'an.184 Defensive wars are considered fard'ayn, an obligation of every
able-bodied Muslim. 185
Classic scholars divided the world into two parts: dar al-Islam (abode
of Islam) and dar al-harb (abode of war), and a perpetual jihad existed
178. See Farhan Bokhari, Jihad Culture Runs Deep in Pakistan, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2005 at 9;
Youssef M. Ibrahim, Silence is a Danger to Islam, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2004, at 15A; Tracy Wilkin-
son, Pope Issues a Rare 'Sorry', L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, at Al.
179. Ali Bulaq, Jihad, in AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE: TERROR AND SUICIDE ATTACKS 63, 67 (Ergtln
Capan ed., Nagihan Halilglu et al. trans,, 2004).
180. See generally id. at 68-69. (explaining that nafs signifies a love for the material world. Bulaq
goes on to explain that humans have two natures, a worldly nature and a spiritual nature. The goal of
humanity is to place the spiritual nature above the worldly nature, and this would be conquering the
nafs).
181. Id. at 70 (citation omitted).
182. Id. at 73 (citation omitted).
183. Sohail H. Hashmi, Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace, in ISLAMIC POLITICAL
ETHICS 194, 205 (Sohail H. Hashmi ed., 2002).
184. See Holy Qur'an, Surah Ash-Shura 42:39 ("And those who, when an oppressive wrong is done
to them, take revenge.").
185. Hashmi, supra note 183, at 205.
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between the two. 186 Majid Khadduri explained that jihad meant a perma-
nent state of war existed, but not continuous fighting. 187 Actual warfare
(qital) was used only as a last resort. 188 The first step was to invite the non-
Muslim state to allow the preaching of Islam in their state; if the ruler de-
nied this invitation, he was offered to incorporate his people within the
Islamic state as protected non-Muslims, and if he still refused, then this
could be grounds for open hostilities. 189 However, participation in an of-
fensive war against dar al-harb was afard kifaya, an obligation on those
who were capable (typically able-bodied, financially stable Muslim
males). 190 This type of war had to be commanded by the ruler of the Is-
lamic state-the ruler decided when to start fighting, when to avoid it, and
when to end it. 191
Most scholars agreed that the object of jihad was not conversion by
the sword, since it would be contrary to Qur'anic verses. 192 These scholars
believed that the goal of jihad was to subjugate the states that refused to
allow the preaching of Islam. 193 However, there are some scholars that
believe that Muslims have an obligation to fight non-believers unless they
accept Islam. 1
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The modernists begin by pointing out that the expressions dar al-
Islam and dar al-harb are not found in the Qur'an or sunnah. 195 These ex-
pressions developed during the Islamic expansion. While the Qur'an does
divide humanity into believers and non-believers, modernists argue that the
Qur'an cannot be interpreted to suggest that a perpetual state of war exists
between the two categories. 196 Modern scholars, such as Mohammad Ta-
laat al-Ghunaimi and Muhammad Abu Zahra, argue that jihad can only be a
war of self-defense. 197 Support for this notion can be found in the sunnah.
Prophet Muhammad never attacked a tribe because it did not believe in
186. Id. at 204-05.
187. MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 64 (1955).
188. Hashmi, supra note 183, at 205.
189. Bassam Tibi, War and Peace in Islam, in ISLAMIC POLITICAL ETHICS, supra note 183, at 175,
177.
190. Hashmi, supra note 183, at 205.
191. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, THE HOLY WAR IDEA IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS 62
(1997).
192. See generally Holy Qur'an, Surah Al-Baqarah 2:256 ("There is no compulsion in religion.
Verily, the Right Path has become distinct from the wrong path)"; id. 10:99 ("And had your Lord
willed, those on earth would have believed, all of them together. So, will you then compel mankind,
until they become believers.").
193. Hashmi, supra note 183, at 207.
194. See KHADDURI, supra note 187, at 75.
195. Tibi, supra note 189, at 177.
196. Hashmi, supra note 183, at 207.
197. Id. at 208.
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Islam. 198 The wars he was involved in were aimed at ending an attack that
was initiated against the Muslims or stopping an imminent attack. 199
While the debate is unsettled, it is important to be aware of the differ-
ent views ofjihad.
IX. ISLAMIC HUMANITARIAN LAW
The Qur'an provides the basis for jus in bello (laws in war): "And
fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits.
Truly, Allah likes not the transgressors. ' '20 0 The limits of war are found in
the sunnah, and from the practices of the caliphs that followed.
There are only small differences between the conduct of war in Islam
and international law.20 1 It is important to realize that the Geneva Conven-
tions came centuries after Islam had already guaranteed certain basic pro-
tections. Islam restricted methods of war and weapons as well as
permissible targets. While warfare has changed over the centuries, the prin-
ciples set forth in Islam are just as relevant today.
The right to life is one of the most basic and inalienable rights in Is-
lam. The Qur'an states that "if anyone killed a person not in retaliation of
murder, or to spread mischief in the land-it would be as if he killed all
mankind, and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all
mankind." 202 Thus, from an Islamic point of view an unjust killing is
equated to killing all mankind. This is because an unjust killing allows for
the possibility that any human can be killed indiscriminately, and this sup-
ports disrespect for life.203 Since Islam holds life in such high esteem, it is
only logical that this belief would carry over into Islamic rules of war.
A. Humanitarian Law in Military Orders
Before Prophet Muhammad sent Usama ibn Zayd to fight the Byzan-
tine army, he gave him the following instructions:
Fight in God's path, fight for God. Fight the aggressors who deny God.
Do not be cruel to people. Do not go against your covenant. Do not cut
down fruit bearing trees. Do not slaughter livestock. Do not kill the pious
198. Hamza Aktan, Acts of Terror and Suicide Attacks in the Light of the Qur 'an and the Sunna, in
AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE: TERROR AND SUICIDE ATTACKS, supra note 179, at 27.
199. Id.
200. Holy Qur'an, SurahAl-Baqarah 2:190.
201. Tibi, supra note 189, at 180.
202. Holy Qur'an, Surah AI- Ma'ida 5:32.
203. Ergiin Qapan, Suicide Attacks and Islam, in AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE: TERROR AND SUICIDE
ATTACKS, supra note 179, at 102, 104.
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who are secluded in monasteries, engaged in worship, children, or
women. Do not wish to encounter the enemy. You may not be aware of
it, but you may face a test with them.
204
Prophet Muhammad told another commander, Abd al-Rahman ibn
Awf, "Do not spoil the goods that you have seized, do not go against your
covenant, and do no amputate the organs of the corpses. Do not kill chil-
dren.' '20 5 Further, Prophet Muhammad prohibited burning or drowning in
battle because it caused unnecessary suffering. 206 The caliphs that came
after Prophet Muhammad echoed these directions. Abu Bakr, the first ca-
liph after Prophet Muhammad, gave these orders to the Muslim army be-
fore they marched towards Syria:
Do not commit treachery, nor depart from the right path. You must not
mutilate, neither kill a child or aged man or woman. Do no destroy a
palm tree, nor bum it with fire and do not cut any fruitful tree. You must
not slay any of the flock or the herds or the camels, save for your subsis-
tence. You are likely to pass by people who have developed their lives to
monastic services; leave them to that to which they have devoted their
lives.
20 7
Umar ibn Al-Khattab, the second caliph, told the commanders of the
Muslim army:
Do not mutilate when you have power to do so. Do not commit excess
when you triumph. Do not kill an old man or a woman or a minor, but try
to avoid them at the time of the encounter of the two armies, and at the
time of the heat of victory, and at the time of expected attacks.
208
Ali, the fourth caliph, ruled when an internal conflict took place
among the Muslims. 209 This would be the equivalent of a non-international
conflict. When he commanded the army he told them:
If you defeat them, do not kill a man in flight, do not finish off a
wounded man, do not uncover a pudendum, or mutilate the dead, do not
rip open a curtain or enter a house without permission, do not take any of
their property, and do not torture or harm their women even though they
may insult your leaders, and remember God, perhaps you will have
knowledge. 2 10
204. Aktan, supra note 198, at 33.
205. Id. at 34
206. Hyder Gulam, Islam, Law and War, https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/issues/2006/2/eLawIslam
%201aw%20and%20war-191006.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
207. HILMI M. ZAWATI, IS JIHAD A JUST WAR? WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ISLAMIC
AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (2001).
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209. See 2 MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: THE EXPANSION OF ISLAM IN THE
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The Qur'an states: "And fight in the way of God those who fight you,
but transgress not the limits. Truly, God likes not the transgressors. ' '211 In
Arabic the phrase "those who fight you" denotes participation. 212 Thus,
those who "participate" would be considered combatants.213 Another ex-
amination of the Arabic reveals an even deeper meaning. The verb "fight"
is imperative and it belongs to a category of collective verbs that implies
that the action must be done by more than one person. 214 Thus, the verse
should be read as "'Do not fight anyone unless they fight you. Fighting is
thus justified if you fight the enemy and the enemy fights you. It is not
justified against anyone who does not fight the Muslims, and it is necessary
to make peace."'' 215 Most scholars agree that there are certain types of peo-
ple that are protected from harm because they do not have the ability to
harm the Muslim army. 216 The real debate among scholars exists in the
classification of combatants and non-combatants.
Wahba al-Zuhayli, a professor of Islamic law at the University of Da-
mascus, argues that combatants include those who directly or indirectly
prepare themselves for battle.217 Thus, he includes soldiers, heads of state,
military leaders, and even military medics or postal carriers. 218 Abu al-A'la
Mawdudi, the founder of Jama'at-i Islam, disagrees with al-Zuhayli and
argues that only those that are engaged in fighting are combatants. 219 How-
ever, Mawdudi proscribes to a medieval theory of combatant, which de-
fines combatants as those who take part in fighting, or those who have the
physical or mental ability to fight. 220 Thus, according to this theory most
adult males are not protected. Noncombatants are those that do not have the
physical or mental ability to fight, or those who do not normally participate
in fighting.221 Mawdudi includes women, children, the elderly, the sick,
211. Holy Qur'an, Surah Al-Baqarah 2:190.
212. Qapan, supra note 203, at 106.
213. Id.
214. Sohail H. Hashmi, Saving and Taking Life in War: Three Modern Muslim Views, in ISLAMIC
ETHICS OF LIFE ABORTION, WAR, AND EUTHANASIA 129, 138 (Jonathan E. Brockopp ed., 2003).
215. Id.
216. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Between Functionalism and Morality: The Juristic Debates on the
Conduct of War, in ISLAMIC ETHICS OF LIFE ABORTION, WAR, AND EUTHANASIA, supra note 214, at
103, 117.
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wounded, the blind, the insane, travelers, and clergy.222 Just as in interna-
tional humanitarian law, all these people would be protected unless they
gave up their immunity by participating in the fighting.223 However, Malik,
an early Islamic jurist, went so far as to warn against killing women and
children who take part in hostilities because the Prophet forbade killing
women and children.224
Beyond Prophet Muhammad's commands to the Muslim army, there
are other incidents in his life that support the idea of protection for non-
combatants. At the end of one battle Prophet Muhammad saw a corpse of a
woman among the dead and he asked those present about her presence.
They told him she was killed by Khalid ibn Walid's army. The Prophet told
one of them to run to Khalid and tell him that he forbade the killing of chil-
dren, women, and servants. 225 Further, the Prophet abandoned a siege at
Taif because it would end with the deaths of innocent women and children
who would be harmed or killed by catapult shots. 226
Since medieval times, Islamic jurists have recognized that noncombat-
ants will be killed unintentionally. 227 Islamic theory excuses Muslim sol-
diers for unintentional killings. 228 A1-Zuhayli argues that with the
advancement of military technology, the loss of life that would normally be
protected is inevitable. 229
Thus, while there is some debate on the exact classification of non-
combatants in Islamic jurisprudence, the Islamic legal rules that were de-
veloping 1400 years ago foreshadow contemporary humanitarian tenets. It
was not until 1907 that Article I of the Hague Convention defined combat-
ants.230 Under the Hague Convention, combatants must be commanded by
a responsible person, they must have a fixed distinctive emblem recogniz-
able from a distance, they must carry arms openly, and they must conduct
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.231 Under
the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, "protected persons"
include the wounded, sick, and ship-wrecked members of the armed forces
and civilians, prisoners of war, civilian internees, civilians on the territory
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Karima Bennoune, Note, As-Saldmu 'Alaykum? Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence,
15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 605,630 (1994).
225. Aktan, supra note 198, at 33.
226. Id. at 41.
227. Hashmi, supra note 214, at 140.
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of the enemy, and civilians in occupied territories. 232 Centuries before these
people were protected by the Geneva Conventions, the Prophet and the
caliphs were already commanding the Muslim army not to harm these cate-
gories of people.
Further, the early Muslim army would fulfill the combatant require-
ment under the Hague Convention. With regard to the first requirement,
during the Prophet's life he always acted as the military commander and
was responsible for the Muslim army.233 After his death, the caliphs ap-
pointed commanders to lead the Muslim army, often appointing a second or
third commander if the others were killed in battle. 234 Thus, during the
early Islamic empire the Muslim army always had a responsible com-
mander that would fulfill this requirement. With regard to a fixed emblem,
there may be some evidence that the Prophet wore a special robe during
military battles. 235 In the Battle of Badr, the first battle in Islam, it is re-
ported that Muslim fighters wore special signs made out of wool. 2 3 6 How-
ever, there is no other proof that the Prophet required the army to wear any
type of specific clothing or uniforms. 237 During the Prophet's time weap-
ons were carried openly. The opposing forces would meet each other on the
battlefield, and before the armies engaged each other it was customary for
duals to take place. 238 Finally, Muslim soldiers were required to conduct
themselves in accordance with the laws of war as seen by the Prophet's and
caliphs' military orders.
C. Prisoners of War
The Qur'an states: "So, when you meet those who disbelieve, smite
(their) necks till when you have killed and wounded many of them, then
bind a bond firmly. Thereafter (is the time) either for generosity (i.e. free
them without ransom), or ransom until the war lays down its burden." 239
According to this verse, prisoners were to be freed, ransomed, or ex-
changed for Muslim prisoners. At the time, custom dictated that the pris-
oner belonged to his captor, but under Islamic law a prisoner of war
232. Gasser, supra note 9, at 227.
233. See SAYYID AMEENUL HASAN RizVI, BATTLES BY THE PROPHET: IN LIGHT OF THE QUR'AN 26
(2002).
234. See MAHMOOD AHMAD G-ADANFAR, COMMANDERS OF THE MUSLIM ARMY 34 (Muhammad
Ayub Sapra ed., Jamila Muhammad Qawi trans., 2001).
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belonged to the state. 240 This is parallel to the Geneva Conventions in that
prisoners of war are not controlled by individuals or military units, but are
in the care of the state, since it is the state that is a party to the Geneva
Conventions. 241 The Islamic head of state had the last word on what was to
happen to prisoners of war.242 The best course of action was the release of
prisoners. For example, after the Battle of Badr Prophet Muhammad re-
leased seventy prisoners on the condition that they teach illiterate Muslims
how to read and write. 243 After the Battle of Hunain it was reported that the
Prophet released 6000 prisoners without conditions or ransom.244 Prisoners
of war were also to be treated kindly. Prophet Muhammad stated:
They are your brothers. God has put them in your hands; so whosoever
has his brother in his hands, let him give food to eat out of what he him-
self eats and let him give him clothes to wear out of what he himself
wears, and do not impose on them a work they are not able to do them-
selves. If at all you give them such work, help them carry it out.245
This is parallel to Article 13 in the Third Geneva Convention which
states, "Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. ' '246 Just as
the Prophet allowed prisoners to do work, Article 49 of the Third Geneva
Convention allows the Detaining Power to utilize prisoners of war for la-
bor.24 7 However, the Prophet added the condition that prisoners should
receive help from the Muslims.
Additionally, there are reports that Muslim soldiers would feed their
prisoners before themselves, and if they did not have enough food they
would release prisoners.2 48 Similarly, Article 26 of the Third Geneva Con-
vention requires that prisoners be given sufficient food to keep them in
good health.2 49 Further, there are reports that it was an Islamic practice to
allow representatives from the enemy force to visit the prisoners for the
purpose of counting them. 250 Likewise, the ICRC is allowed to visit prison-
ers of war.2
5 1
There was an incident where a Muslim solider told a Persian captive
not to be afraid, but then killed him. When the second caliph, Umar ibn Al-
240. MAHER HATHOUT, JIHAD VS. TERRORISM 25 (Samer Hathout ed., 2002).
241. Gasser, supra note 9, at 241.
242. HATHOUT, supra note 240, at 25.
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251. Id.
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Khattab, heard this he wrote to the commander of the army and stated: "As
God as my witness, if I hear anyone has done this, I shall cut his neck. '252
While it has been reported that Prophet Muhammad killed some prisoners,
it has been argued that this was only for specific prisoners that committed
crimes prior to the start of hostilities. 253 This is analogous to the prosecu-
tion for crimes committed outside the scope of hostilities, or due to viola-
tions of humanitarian law. 254 Thus, there are many parallels between
Islamic law and international law relating to prisoners of war.
D. Tactics and Weapons
While the Prophet and the Caliphs forbade killing livestock and burn-
ing crops, later Islamic scholars have given contrary rulings. This may be
evidence that the theory ofjihad shifted for political reasons. For instance,
Abu Hanifa, an early Islamic jurist, ruled that everything the army could
not control should be destroyed, including houses, churches, trees, clocks
and herds.255 Another early Islamic jurist, Shafi, stated that anything life-
less could be destroyed, including trees, but animals could only be killed if
the army thought they would strengthen the enemy. 256
Islam has also laid down rules for permissible tactics and weapons.
First, the enemy should not be killed by burning due to the hadith: "Do not
punish a creature of God with the punishment of God. '257 Most jurists have
ruled that using poisoned weapons against the enemy is unlawful. 258 How-
ever, Abu Hanifa allowed the use of catapults and flooding against the
enemy. 259 Abu Hanifa explained his ruling and stated that if the Muslims
halted their attacks because they feared killing noncombatants, they would
not be able to fight at all.260 Abu Hanifa's justification was consistent with
other medieval Islamic scholars of the time. Many early Islamic jurists
believed that Muslim forces should exercise discrimination in war, but if
there is collateral damage it is the enemy's fault because they made protec-
tion of noncombatants impossible. 261 This is similar to the principle of
252. Hilmi M. Abdul Rahman, Just War, Peace and Human Rights Under Islamic and International
Law 114 (1997) (unpublished Master of Arts thesis, McGill University) (on file with Chicago-Kent
Law Review).
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proportionality, which states that a belligerent must refrain from launching
an attack "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated. '262 In evaluating the proportionality of the attack to
the collateral damage, it is the overall military advantage, i.e., both the
gains from the specific attack and the possible implications and ramifica-
tions to the enemy, that must be taken into account. 263 Thus, while Abu
Hanifa's opinion may contradict Islamic law, it could be parallel to the
laws of international armed conflict.
Islam also deals with the issue of reciprocity. The Qur'an states,
"Then whoever transgresses the prohibition against you, you transgress
likewise against him. And fear Allah, and know Allah is with the pious.
'264
Thus, Muslim soldiers may deal with the enemy on a reciprocal basis while
on the battlefield. 265 However, the verse states that Muslim soldiers must
exercise self-restraint, so if the enemy were to kill and mutilate Muslim
bodies, the Muslims would not be allowed to imitate the enemy. 266 Further,
even when warfare and killing is authorized, it cannot be excessive. The
Qur'an states: "And do not kill anyone whose killing Allah has forbidden,
except for just cause. And whoever is killed wrongfully, we have given his
heir the authority. But let him not exceed limits in the matter of taking
life."'267 Thus, Muslim fighters should not kill when they cannot distinguish
between civilians and combatants. This is similar to the principle of distinc-
tion, which states that it is prohibited to deliberately attack civilians. 268
Few Islamic scholars have written on current topics such as nuclear or
chemical weapons. AI-Zuhayli does not limit the possibility of acquiring
such weapons as a deterrent against enemies, but he says that Muslims
should not be the first to use such weapons because it would cause the
death of noncombatants. 269
Thus, while Hugo Grotius is often considered to be the father of the
modem law of nations, it is important to be aware that many principles of
262. Protocol I, supra note 66, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
263. CASSESE, supra note 67, at 418 (emphasis added).
264. Holy Qur'an, Surah Al-Baqarah 2:194.
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modem international law can be found in Islamic international law.
270
While it may not be important who the father of international law is:
It is important to be aware of the comparative sources from which rules
of our modem law may have come. This realization is, to say nothing
else, helpful in making the norms of this law more acceptable to numer-
ous nations as truly a law of nations and not merely a contemporary evo-
lution of the last 200 years of the norms of European public law.
271
X. ISLAMIC LAW APPLIED TO HAMAS
While international humanitarian law clearly condemns Hamas's mili-
tary strategy, there is a rigorous debate among Muslims on the legality of
its actions. The Islamic legal arguments against the operations rely on the
prohibition of killing noncombatants and the prohibition against suicide.
272
Sheikh Muhammad Sa'id Tantawi, head of Egypt's Al-Azhar mosque and
university, declared that the Shari'a "rejects all attempts on human life, and
in the name of the Shari'a, we condemn all attacks on civilians, whatever
their community or state responsible for such an attack. ' 273 Similarly,
Sheikh Muhammad bin 'Abdalla as-Sabil, member of the Saudi council of
senior clerics, spoke against suicide attacks when he stated that "any attack
on innocent people is unlawful and contrary to the Shari'a. ''274 On the other
hand, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, head of the Sunni studies department at
Qatar University, opposed these rulings based on the premise that Israelis
were not civilians, but combatants in a war of occupation waged against
Palestinians. 275 He noted that both men and women serve in the military
and can be drafted. 276 Likewise, Abd al-Azim al-Mit'ani, a lecturer at Al-
Azhar University, stated that "it is a fact that Israel is one big military
camp. There is no real civilian there. It is the Palestinians' right to hit all
the inhabitants of Israel as they can."'277 Al-Mit'ani further argued that the
Prophet's prohibition against targeting women, children, and the elderly did
not apply to the Palestinian bombers because the Prophet was referring to
ordinary wars between two armies, and the situation in Palestine is differ-
270. Hassan, supra note 168, at 74.
271. Id.
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ent because the Palestinians are facing an enemy that attacks indiscrimi-
nately. 278 A Hamas military leader commented:
Our stand is not to target children, the elderly, or places of prayer-even
though these places of prayer incite the killing of Muslims. Up until now
we have not targeted schools.., nor do we target hospitals, even though
they are an easy target. That is because we are working in accordance
with certain values ... we don't fight Jews because they are Jewish but
because they occupy our lands. So if children are killed it is something
outside of our hands. 279
The underlying debate revolves around the status of Israelis as com-
batants. As previously discussed, there is a wide range of opinions on who
may be classified as a combatant; it is doubtful, however, that any of the
classical Islamic scholars previously cited would confer combatant status
on an entire nation. AI-Zuhayli stated that combatants included anyone who
prepared for battle either directly or indirectly, while Mawdudi defined
combatants as those who take part in fighting, or those who have the physi-
cal or mental ability to fight. 280 Certainly not every Israeli citizen prepares
himself for battle. While the Defense Service Law imposes a duty on Israeli
citizens who reach the age of eighteen (both male and female) to serve in
the military, the Minister of Defense has discretion to exempt certain per-
sons. 281 This exemption is granted to many male and female ultra-
Orthodox Jews who are full-time religious students, as well as to Arab-
Israeli citizens. 282 Section 40 of the Defense Service Law automatically
exempts a Jewish woman from regular and reserve service if she makes a
written declaration before a judge that states her religious convictions pre-
vent her from performing military service, that she observes Jewish dietary
laws, and that she does not ride in vehicles on the Sabbath.283 The law does
not require an investigation into whether the declaration is genuine.284 Ad-
ditionally, many Israelis refuse to participate in military service for reasons
of conscience. 285 Thus, there are many Israelis that are exempt from mili-
tary service or refuse to fight. These individuals do not prepare for battle or
take any part in the fighting whatsoever and thus cannot be considered
combatants under Islamic law.
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The military requirement lasts three years for men and two years for
women. 286 Thereafter, men and women are required to perform a period of
reserve service each year until men reach fifty-one and women reach
twenty-four. 287 While women serve with men, they are still largely prohib-
ited from positions with a "direct combat" label.288 Thus, even though Is-
raeli citizens may be called up for duty each year, this does not mean they
can always be classified as combatants according to Islamic principles.
Reservists do not prepare themselves for battle until they are called to ser-
vice, nor do they take part in fighting unless they are called. Thus, the ar-
gument that all Israeli citizens are combatants that are entitled to be
attacked is weak.
Islam's prohibition of suicide can be found in the Qur'an and hadith.
The Qur'an states, "0 you who believe! Eat not up your property among
yourselves unjustly except it be a trade amongst you, by mutual consent.
And do not kill yourselves. Surely, Allah is Most Merciful to you. '289 Ad-
ditionally, there are many hadiths where the Prophet prohibits suicide and
states that the punishment for suicide is hell. 290 While there is consensus
that suicide is prohibited, some Islamic jurists do not categorize Hamas
attacks as suicide bombings, but martyrdom operations. 291 Qaradawi states
that suicide applies to someone who kills himself for personal reasons,
while a martyr sacrifices himself in self-defense on behalf of the entire
Muslim community. 292 Tantawi joined this opinion when he stated that
"the suicide operations are of self-defense and a kind of martyrdom, as long
as the intention behind them is to kill the enemy's soldiers, and not women
or children. 293 On the other hand, Sheik Abd Al-Aziz bin Abdallah Al-
Sheik, a cleric in Saudi Arabia, stated that:
I am not aware of anything in the religious law regarding killing oneself
in the heart of the enemy's rank, or what is called "suicide." This is not
part of Jihad, and I fear that it is merely killing oneself. Although the
Qur'an permits and even demands the killing of the enemy, this must be
done in ways that do not contradict the Shari'a.294
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The martyrdom classification is based on the premise that Hamas is
killing combatants instead of civilians. As noted previously, the argument
that all Israeli civilians are combatants is weak.
Modem Islamic jurists also rely on the theory of necessity to condone
martyrdom operations. Qaradawi allows martyrdom operations even when
there are civilian casualties because he states:
Israeli society is militarist in nature. Both men and women serve in the
army and can be drafted at any moment. If a child or an elderly is killed
in such an operation, he is not killed on purpose, but by mistake, and as a
result of military necessity. Necessity justifies the forbidden. 295
Further, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, founder and spiritual leader of Hamas
stated, "Once we have warplanes and missiles, then we can think of chang-
ing our means of legitimate self-defense. But right now, we can only tackle
the fire with our bare hands and sacrifice ourselves. '' 296 During medieval
times the theory of necessity was used to legitimize acts that were normally
prohibited under the Qur'an and sunnah. 297 One justification for necessity
is the public welfare of the Muslim community. 298 For instance, Al-
Ghazali, an early Islamic jurist, stated that if a non-Muslim enemy threat-
ened to take Islamic territory and kill all the Muslims, it would be permis-
sible to use actions that were prohibited in the Qur'an and sunnah.299 Al-
Ghazali's threshold was high and required that nearly all Muslims face
extermination before the theory could be invoked. 300 On the other hand,
Shaybani, one of the foremost writers on the siyar, would allow the Muslim
army to flood, fire, or bombard a city even if women, children, and the
elderly were inside because if they were not allowed to, the Muslims would
be unable to go to war at all.
30 1
The next justification for necessity is the principle of reciprocity. 302
The Qur'an states, "So whoever commits a hostility against you, respond to
him with a similar hostility. And fear God, and know that God is with those
that restrain themselves. ' '303 Many medieval jurists believed that reciproc-
ity allowed the Muslim army to use indiscriminate methods if the enemy
used them first.304 However, after every Qur'anic verse permitting recip-
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rocity is a verse ordering restraint and forgiveness. 305 AI-Zuhayli, a modem
Islamic scholar, stated:
In the arena of battle, the ends justify the means, according to the Islamic
view. This does not mean that the desire for victory subsumes humanitar-
ian principles, which limit necessity or military requirements, whether
they relate to the methods of fighting and the destruction of enemy in-
stallations and military fortifications, or to issues relating to enemy per-
son and the seizing of their property. 306
Hamas relies more on the idea of reciprocity to condone its military
tactics. Hamas states that its attacks are in response to the killing of Pales-
tinian civilians by Israelis. 307 From Hamas's inception in 1987 through
April 2006, the Israeli human rights organization B' Tselem reported that
1,426 Israelis, military personnel, and civilians were killed by Hamas (and
all other Palestinian factions combined), compared with 5,050 Palestinian
civilians killed by Israel during the same years. 308 Further, Hamas states
that there will be an immediate halt to its attacks as soon as Israel declares
it will do the same. 309 While Hamas was founded in 1987, its first suicide
attack did not take place until 1994, and the attack was in direct response to
the killing of twenty-nine Palestinian worshippers inside the Abrahimic
Mosque by an Israeli settler.310 Prior to 1994, Hamas's policies were to
only target legitimate military targets. 311
While Hamas's necessity and reciprocity arguments have more legiti-
macy within Islamic law, Hamas does not need to use such tactics. As
noted previously, the Qur'an and sunnah revolve around restraint and for-
giveness. Just because innocent Palestinian civilians are killed does not
mean that Hamas has to resort to the same actions. Moreover, Hamas's
tactics have not produced many tangible results for ordinary Palestinians.
This is more of a reason for Hamas to implement the Islamic principles of
restraint and mercy. Implementing these principles will gain the newly-
elected Hamas government international recognition and a chance to nego-
tiate a Palestinian state.
It is interesting to note that virtually all the above clerics condemn at-
tacks outside of Palestine. For instance, Qaradawi, the cleric that lends the
most support to Hamas, condemned the September 11 th attacks on the
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. HROUB, supra note 3, at 52.
308. Id. at 54-55.
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United States.312 He stated: "The Palestinian who blows himself up is a
person who is defending his homeland. When he attacks an occupier en-
emy, he is attacking a legitimate target. This is different from someone who
leaves his country and goes to strike a target with which he has no dis-
pute.",
3 13
Similarly, Tantawi stated that "jihad in Islam was ordained in order to
support the oppressed and defend sacred places, human lives, personal
funds, occupied land, and so on. Terrorism, on the other hand, is an aggres-
sion and an insistence on killing innocent people, civilians, and peaceful
people.,,
3 14
Since the September 11 th rulings and the rulings on Palestine seem
contradictory, we must ask what is unique about the Israeli/Palestinian
conflict. Hamas's primary argument is based on reciprocity. As noted
above, a disproportionate number of Palestinian civilians have been killed,
but Israel also commits other international violations. In 1967 the United
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242, which called for an end to
the Israeli occupation of lands acquired by force.315 Since 1967, there have
been at least four additional resolutions calling for an end to the occupa-
tion, and calling for Israel to meet its obligations to the Palestinians as a
belligerent occupier.316
United Nations Security Council Resolution 446 determined "that the
policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian
and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and
constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and
lasting peace in the Middle East."'317 While the Security Council has tried
to pass more resolutions on the illegality of Israeli settlements, the United
States has abstained from voting on these proposed resolutions. 318 Further,
when Israeli citizens build settlements in the West Bank and Gaza the Is-
raeli government violates Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
which states that "[t]he Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts
of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. '319 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice recently released an advisory opinion on the legality
312. Malka, supra note 272, at 22.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 26.
315. S.C. Res. 242, } 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967).
316. Ash U Bali, International Law & Rights-Based Remedies in the Israel-Palestine Conflict:
Settlements, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 387, 394-395 (2005).
317. S.C. Res. 446, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (March 22, 1979).
318. George E. Bisharat, Facts, Rights, and Remedies: Implementing International Law in the
Israel/Palestine Conflict, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV 319, 321 (2005).
319. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 134, art. 49.
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of Israel's separation barrier.320 In the opinion it held that the settlements
were illegal pursuant to Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
321
Additionally, in 2001, Israel began construction of a security barrier to
separate Israel from the West Bank.322 Israel cited the increasing number of
terrorist attacks as justification for the barrier. 323 Since Israel's construction
infringed on large sections of Palestinian land, the barrier is the focus of
intense criticism. 324 It is argued that Israel is de facto annexing Palestinian
territory, and that the barrier is not for security reasons. 325 Further, the
route Israel chose for the barrier encompasses Israeli settlements in the
Palestinian territory, which are regarded as illegal. 326 Lastly, Palestinians
who live beside the barrier are subject to land expropriations and limited
access to vital services, which is an infringement on their human rights.
327
In 2004, the International Court of Justice released an advisory opinion on
the barrier.328 It found that the construction in Palestinian territories was
illegal, and that Israel was obligated to cease construction, dismantle the
structure already built, repeal or render ineffective all legislative acts re-
lated to it, and make reparations for the damages caused by the barrier.32
9
The court was unconvinced that the barrier was for security purposes and
held it infringed on several rights, including freedom of movement and the
right to work, health, education, and an adequate standard of living.330
Beyond the settlements and the barrier, Israel also engages in house
demolitions. Since 2004, 1,713 homes have been demolished for alleged
military purposes. 331 The demolitions have left 12,541 people homeless.
332
Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of
real or personal property by an Occupying Power unless "such destruction
is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. '333 Even if Israel
320. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J 136, 201 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/16
71 .pdf [hereinafter Advisory Opinion on Wall Construction].
321. Id.
322. Daphne Barak-Erez, Israel: The Security Barrier-Between International Law, Constitutional
Law, and Domestic Judicial Review, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 540, 540 (2006).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 541.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Advisory Opinion on Wall Construction, supra note 320, at 201.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 189-198.
331. See B'Tselem, Demolition for Alleged Military Purposes, http://www.btselem.org/english/
Razing/Statistics.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
332. Id.
333. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 134, art. 53.
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argues that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply, Article 23 of the
Hague Regulations states it is forbidden "to destroy or seize the enemy's
property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war."'334 Israeli house demolitions are not military neces-
sities; rather, they are punitive measures. Israeli law allows a military
commander to order the forfeiture of any home if there is reason to suspect
illegal acts, and after the land is forfeited the commander may destroy the
house or the structure or anything growing on the land. 335 The fact that the
demolitions are punitive measures defeats any assertion that they are mili-
tary necessities. Therefore, they violate international humanitarian law.
Israel also illegally targets medical personnel and hospitals. Article 20
of the Fourth Geneva Convention states, "Persons regularly and solely
engaged in the operation and administration of civilian hospitals, including
the personnel engaged in the search for, removal and transporting of and
caring for wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases, shall
be respected and protected. '336 The Palestinian Red Crescent Society, the
main provider of medical care in the Palestinian territories, documented
174 attacks on its ambulances by Israeli soldiers and settlers between Sep-
tember 29, 2000, and March 15, 2002.337 Even the ICRC released a press
release in April 5, 2002, stating that it was forced to limit its members'
movements in the West Bank because the Israeli army attacked its staff.338
Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits attacks on civilian
hospitals.339 However, the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Commit-
tees, the largest nongovernmental health provider, reported its Medical
Equipment Loan center, Optometry center, and School of Community
Health sustained heavy damages during the second intifada.
340
Beyond these specific violations, human rights organizations (includ-
ing Amnesty International and Israel's own B'Tselem) have issued numer-
ous statements criticizing Israel for its human rights violations. 341 Some
violations include torture of over 50,000 Palestinians, deportation of over
334. Hague Convention IV, supra note 17, Annex art 23(g).
335. See B'Tselem, Demolition for Alleged Military Purposes: International Humanitarian Law,
http://www.btselem.org/english/Razing/Humanitarian_Law.asp (last visited Dec. 14, 2007).
336. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 134, art. 20.
337. Lama Jamjoun, The Effects of Israeli Violations During the Second Uprising "Intifiada'" on
Palestinian Health Conditions, SOC. JUST.: GLOBAL THREATS TO SECURITY, 2002, at 53, 56.
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339. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 134, art. 18.
340. Jamjoun, supra note 337, at 58.
341. Imseis, supra note 18, at 68.
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1,500 Palestinians, and the expropriation of Palestinian natural resources
such as water, quarries, and trees.
342
While the focus of this note is not a critique of Israel's actions, its ag-
gression plays a major role in Palestinian behavior and politics, as well as
how Muslims across the world view the conflict. Hamas uses Israeli viola-
tions to justify its own attacks. While Hamas may violate international law,
it still receives support because the international community fails to enforce
international law against Israel. Moreover, Israel's aggression also makes it
easier for Islamic leaders to condone Hamas's military tactics.
However, the solution to the problem cannot be a never-ending circle
of finger pointing. While Islam is subject to many interpretations, Hamas
can be presented with a strong argument that suicide bombing is contrary to
Islamic law. Suicide bombing cannot be justified based on the notion that
all Israeli citizens are combatants, and if Israeli citizens are not combatants
the idea that the operation is martyrdom instead of suicide is weakened.
While the theories of necessity and reciprocity hold more legitimacy, Islam
is a religion that is based on mercy, self-restraint, and forgiveness. These
concepts should be stressed. Moreover, its tactics are not the optimal way
to achieve peace. If reciprocal measures are not working, Hamas should
now attempt to practice the self-restraint described in the Qur'an and sun-
nah. Hamas's militant tactics have put a chokehold on its ability to govern
and broker peace for the Palestinians, thus, this is the ideal time to present
it with an Islamic argument to alter its policies.
CONCLUSION
Islamic humanitarian law clearly coincides with many principles
adopted in international humanitarian law. With so many similarities, it
does not seem possible that the two frameworks could come to completely
opposite conclusions regarding suicide bombing. Suicide bombing seems
contrary to a religion that equates an unjust killing with the killing all of
mankind.343 Israeli aggression and the lack of international intervention are
often cited as justifications for suicide bombings. 344 Thus, it is essential
that the world community intervene to force Israel to comply with interna-
tional law. If Muslims believe that Israel can be held accountable for its
violations, and that Israel can conform to international law, the chances for
peace will increase exponentially.
342. Id.
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It is then up to the Muslims to unite and present an argument to
Hamas that suicide bombings do not coincide with Islamic law. The Pales-
tinians have a legitimate right of self-determination that the international
community recognizes. If Hamas is going to lead the Palestinian people to
the realization of this right, Islam must be used as the basis to bring them to
the table. Hamas cares little if it violates international law because Islam is
its basis. Thus, it is imperative that the Muslim world unite to persuade
Hamas that its tactics are not only contrary to Islamic law, but are not fur-
thering the Palestinian cause.

